Hashpower allocation in Pay-per-Share blockchain mining pools
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866914161766694912 |
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| author | Goffard, Pierre-Olivier Albrecher, Hansjoerg Fouque, Jean-Pierre |
| author_facet | Goffard, Pierre-Olivier Albrecher, Hansjoerg Fouque, Jean-Pierre |
| contents | Mining blocks in a blockchain using the \textit{Proof-of-Work} consensus protocol involves significant risk, as network participants face continuous operational costs while earning infrequent capital gains upon successfully mining a block. A common risk mitigation strategy is to join a mining pool, which combines the computing resources of multiple miners to provide a more stable income. This article examines a Pay-per-Share (PPS) reward system, where the pool manager can adjust both the share difficulty and the management fee. Using a simplified wealth model for miners, we explore how miners should allocate their computing resources among different mining pools, considering the trade-off between risk transfer to the manager and management fees. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_13777 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Hashpower allocation in Pay-per-Share blockchain mining pools Goffard, Pierre-Olivier Albrecher, Hansjoerg Fouque, Jean-Pierre Cryptography and Security Optimization and Control Probability Mining blocks in a blockchain using the \textit{Proof-of-Work} consensus protocol involves significant risk, as network participants face continuous operational costs while earning infrequent capital gains upon successfully mining a block. A common risk mitigation strategy is to join a mining pool, which combines the computing resources of multiple miners to provide a more stable income. This article examines a Pay-per-Share (PPS) reward system, where the pool manager can adjust both the share difficulty and the management fee. Using a simplified wealth model for miners, we explore how miners should allocate their computing resources among different mining pools, considering the trade-off between risk transfer to the manager and management fees. |
| title | Hashpower allocation in Pay-per-Share blockchain mining pools |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Optimization and Control Probability |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13777 |