Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.14103 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866918358918627328 |
|---|---|
| author | Skënderaj, Arlindo |
| author_facet | Skënderaj, Arlindo |
| contents | I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before receiving the signal realization. I characterize the data broker's optimal selling mechanism, which involves screening over all possible signals. I allow the space of all signals the data broker can sell to be arbitrarily correlated with the signal the decision maker owns. This plays a key role in designing the optimal menu. In the binary action setting, the data broker extracts the efficient surplus by offering a distinct binary signal for each type. Moreover, this result holds even when the broker does not know the prior distribution over states. In more general environments, I provide conditions on the payoff structure and the decision maker's type space under which the data broker extracts the efficient surplus. I discuss scenarios in which efficient surplus extraction is not possible. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_14103 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selling supplemental information Skënderaj, Arlindo Theoretical Economics I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before receiving the signal realization. I characterize the data broker's optimal selling mechanism, which involves screening over all possible signals. I allow the space of all signals the data broker can sell to be arbitrarily correlated with the signal the decision maker owns. This plays a key role in designing the optimal menu. In the binary action setting, the data broker extracts the efficient surplus by offering a distinct binary signal for each type. Moreover, this result holds even when the broker does not know the prior distribution over states. In more general environments, I provide conditions on the payoff structure and the decision maker's type space under which the data broker extracts the efficient surplus. I discuss scenarios in which efficient surplus extraction is not possible. |
| title | Selling supplemental information |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.14103 |