Realist and Pluralist Conceptions of Intelligence and Their Implications on AI Research
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917156038377472 |
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| author | Oldenburg, Ninell Dhar, Ruchira Søgaard, Anders |
| author_facet | Oldenburg, Ninell Dhar, Ruchira Søgaard, Anders |
| contents | In this paper, we argue that current AI research operates on a spectrum between two different underlying conceptions of intelligence: Intelligence Realism, which holds that intelligence represents a single, universal capacity measurable across all systems, and Intelligence Pluralism, which views intelligence as diverse, context-dependent capacities that cannot be reduced to a single universal measure. Through an analysis of current debates in AI research, we demonstrate how the conceptions remain largely implicit yet fundamentally shape how empirical evidence gets interpreted across a wide range of areas. These underlying views generate fundamentally different research approaches across three areas. Methodologically, they produce different approaches to model selection, benchmark design, and experimental validation. Interpretively, they lead to contradictory readings of the same empirical phenomena, from capability emergence to system limitations. Regarding AI risk, they generate categorically different assessments: realists view superintelligence as the primary risk and search for unified alignment solutions, while pluralists see diverse threats across different domains requiring context-specific solutions. We argue that making explicit these underlying assumptions can contribute to a clearer understanding of disagreements in AI research. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_15282 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Realist and Pluralist Conceptions of Intelligence and Their Implications on AI Research Oldenburg, Ninell Dhar, Ruchira Søgaard, Anders Artificial Intelligence In this paper, we argue that current AI research operates on a spectrum between two different underlying conceptions of intelligence: Intelligence Realism, which holds that intelligence represents a single, universal capacity measurable across all systems, and Intelligence Pluralism, which views intelligence as diverse, context-dependent capacities that cannot be reduced to a single universal measure. Through an analysis of current debates in AI research, we demonstrate how the conceptions remain largely implicit yet fundamentally shape how empirical evidence gets interpreted across a wide range of areas. These underlying views generate fundamentally different research approaches across three areas. Methodologically, they produce different approaches to model selection, benchmark design, and experimental validation. Interpretively, they lead to contradictory readings of the same empirical phenomena, from capability emergence to system limitations. Regarding AI risk, they generate categorically different assessments: realists view superintelligence as the primary risk and search for unified alignment solutions, while pluralists see diverse threats across different domains requiring context-specific solutions. We argue that making explicit these underlying assumptions can contribute to a clearer understanding of disagreements in AI research. |
| title | Realist and Pluralist Conceptions of Intelligence and Their Implications on AI Research |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15282 |