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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15727 |
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| _version_ | 1866912719512272896 |
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| author | Csóka, Endre |
| author_facet | Csóka, Endre |
| contents | For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent mechanisms. The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism with transfers (TU-GUM) implements efficiency in a Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE). Its transfer-free variant (NTU-GUM) implements approximate efficiency in ε-GUE. In this paper, we define prior-free versions of both TU-GUM and NTU-GUM. As a special case, we believe that the new prior-free NTU-GUM implements a 1.283-approximation to Pareto efficiency for the repeated single good allocation problem in Fikioris, Banerjee, and Tardos (2024). |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_15727 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms Csóka, Endre Computer Science and Game Theory For a general class of dynamic stochastic multi-player problems, Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov, and Teytelboym (2024) proposed prior-dependent mechanisms. The Guaranteed Utility Mechanism with transfers (TU-GUM) implements efficiency in a Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium (GUE). Its transfer-free variant (NTU-GUM) implements approximate efficiency in ε-GUE. In this paper, we define prior-free versions of both TU-GUM and NTU-GUM. As a special case, we believe that the new prior-free NTU-GUM implements a 1.283-approximation to Pareto efficiency for the repeated single good allocation problem in Fikioris, Banerjee, and Tardos (2024). |
| title | Prior-free Collusion-proof Dynamic Mechanisms |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.15727 |