Distributed MIS Algorithms for Rational Agents using Games

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Salevemula, Nithin, Pai, Shreyas
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866912721238228992
author Salevemula, Nithin
Pai, Shreyas
author_facet Salevemula, Nithin
Pai, Shreyas
contents We study the problem of computing a Maximal Independent Set (MIS) in distributed networks where each node is a rational agent whose payoff depends on whether it joins the MIS. Classical distributed algorithms assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol, but this assumption fails when nodes are strategic and may deviate if doing so increases their expected utility. Standard MIS algorithms rely on honest randomness or unique identifiers to break symmetry. In rational settings, however, agents may manipulate randomness, and relying solely on identifiers can create unfairness, giving some nodes zero probability of joining the MIS and thus no incentive to participate. To address these issues, we propose two algorithms based on a utility model in which agents seek locally correct solutions while also having preferences over which solution is chosen. Randomness in our algorithms is generated through pairwise interactions between neighboring nodes, viewed as simple games in which no single node can unilaterally affect the outcome. This allows symmetry breaking while remaining compatible with rational behavior. For both algorithms, we prove that at every stage of the execution, given any history, no agent can increase its expected utility through a unilateral deviation, assuming others follow the algorithm. This gives a stronger guarantee than Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium. When all nodes follow the protocol, every node has a positive probability of joining the MIS, and the final output is a correct MIS. Under mild additional assumptions, both algorithms terminate in $O(\log n)$ rounds with high probability.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_16533
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Distributed MIS Algorithms for Rational Agents using Games
Salevemula, Nithin
Pai, Shreyas
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Computer Science and Game Theory
We study the problem of computing a Maximal Independent Set (MIS) in distributed networks where each node is a rational agent whose payoff depends on whether it joins the MIS. Classical distributed algorithms assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol, but this assumption fails when nodes are strategic and may deviate if doing so increases their expected utility. Standard MIS algorithms rely on honest randomness or unique identifiers to break symmetry. In rational settings, however, agents may manipulate randomness, and relying solely on identifiers can create unfairness, giving some nodes zero probability of joining the MIS and thus no incentive to participate. To address these issues, we propose two algorithms based on a utility model in which agents seek locally correct solutions while also having preferences over which solution is chosen. Randomness in our algorithms is generated through pairwise interactions between neighboring nodes, viewed as simple games in which no single node can unilaterally affect the outcome. This allows symmetry breaking while remaining compatible with rational behavior. For both algorithms, we prove that at every stage of the execution, given any history, no agent can increase its expected utility through a unilateral deviation, assuming others follow the algorithm. This gives a stronger guarantee than Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium. When all nodes follow the protocol, every node has a positive probability of joining the MIS, and the final output is a correct MIS. Under mild additional assumptions, both algorithms terminate in $O(\log n)$ rounds with high probability.
title Distributed MIS Algorithms for Rational Agents using Games
topic Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.16533