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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.17714 |
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Table of Contents:
- Standard decision frameworks address uncertainty about facts but assume fixed options and values. We extend the Jeffrey-Bolker framework to model refinements in values and prove a value-of-information theorem for axiological refinement. In multi-agent settings, we establish that mutual refinement will characteristically transform zero-sum games into positive-sum interactions and yield Pareto-improvements in Nash bargaining. These results show that a framework of rational choice can be extended to model value refinement. By unifying epistemic and axiological refinement under a single formalism, we broaden the conceptual foundations of rational choice and illuminate the normative status of ethical deliberation.