Many-Eyes and Sentinels in Selfish and Cooperative Groups
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914168851922944 |
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| author | Pilgrim, Charlie Bate, Andrew M Sigalou, Anna Aellen, Mélisande Morford, Joe Warren, Elizabeth Krupenye, Christopher Biro, Dora Mann, Richard P |
| author_facet | Pilgrim, Charlie Bate, Andrew M Sigalou, Anna Aellen, Mélisande Morford, Joe Warren, Elizabeth Krupenye, Christopher Biro, Dora Mann, Richard P |
| contents | Collective vigilance describes how animals in groups benefit from the predator detection efforts of others. Empirical observations typically find either a many-eyes strategy with all (or many) group members maintaining a low level of individual vigilance, or a sentinel strategy with one (or a few) individuals maintaining a high level of individual vigilance while others do not. With a general analytical treatment that makes minimal assumptions, we show that these two strategies are alternate solutions to the same adaptive problem of balancing the costs of predation and vigilance. Which strategy is preferred depends on how costs scale with the level of individual vigilance: many-eyes strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise gently at low levels but become steeper at higher levels (convex; e.g. an open field); sentinel strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise steeply at low levels and then flatten out (concave; e.g. environments with vantage points). This same dichotomy emerges whether individuals act selfishly to optimise their own fitness or cooperatively to optimise group fitness. The model is extended to explain discrete behavioural switching between strategies and differential levels of vigilance such as edge effects. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_19093 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Many-Eyes and Sentinels in Selfish and Cooperative Groups Pilgrim, Charlie Bate, Andrew M Sigalou, Anna Aellen, Mélisande Morford, Joe Warren, Elizabeth Krupenye, Christopher Biro, Dora Mann, Richard P Populations and Evolution Multiagent Systems Biological Physics Collective vigilance describes how animals in groups benefit from the predator detection efforts of others. Empirical observations typically find either a many-eyes strategy with all (or many) group members maintaining a low level of individual vigilance, or a sentinel strategy with one (or a few) individuals maintaining a high level of individual vigilance while others do not. With a general analytical treatment that makes minimal assumptions, we show that these two strategies are alternate solutions to the same adaptive problem of balancing the costs of predation and vigilance. Which strategy is preferred depends on how costs scale with the level of individual vigilance: many-eyes strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise gently at low levels but become steeper at higher levels (convex; e.g. an open field); sentinel strategies are preferred where costs of vigilance rise steeply at low levels and then flatten out (concave; e.g. environments with vantage points). This same dichotomy emerges whether individuals act selfishly to optimise their own fitness or cooperatively to optimise group fitness. The model is extended to explain discrete behavioural switching between strategies and differential levels of vigilance such as edge effects. |
| title | Many-Eyes and Sentinels in Selfish and Cooperative Groups |
| topic | Populations and Evolution Multiagent Systems Biological Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.19093 |