Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | Dütting, Paul, Ezra, Tomer, Feldman, Michal, Kesselheim, Thomas |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
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