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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.21764 |
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| _version_ | 1866917107557466112 |
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| author | Swami, Shreyansh Singh, Ishwardeep Singh, Ujjwalpreet Pant, Chinmay Prawah |
| author_facet | Swami, Shreyansh Singh, Ishwardeep Singh, Ujjwalpreet Pant, Chinmay Prawah |
| contents | Polymorphic malware continually alters its structure to evade signature-based defences, challenging both commercial antivirus (AV) and enterprise detection systems. This study introduces a reproducible framework for analysing eight polymorphic behaviours-junk code insertion, control-flow obfuscation, packing, data encoding, domain generation, randomized beacon timing, protocol mimicry, and format/header tweaks-and evaluates their detectability across three layers: commercial AVs, custom rule-based detectors (YARA/Sigma), and endpoint detection and response (EDR) telemetry. Eleven inert polymorphic variants were generated per behaviour using controlled mutation engines and executed in isolated environments. Detection performance was assessed by detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and combined coverage. AVs achieved an average DR of 34%, YARA/Sigma 74% and EDR 76%; integrated detection reached ~92% with an FPR of 3.5%. Iterative YARA tuning showed a trade-off between detection and FPR, while behaviour-specific trends revealed static polymorphisms were best caught by custom rules, dynamic by EDR, and network-level by Sigma-like analysis. These results affirm that hybrid detection pipelines combining static, dynamic, and network-layer analytics offer resilient defence against polymorphic malware and form a baseline for future adaptive detection research. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_21764 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Adaptive Detection of Polymorphic Malware: Leveraging Mutation Engines and YARA Rules for Enhanced Security Swami, Shreyansh Singh, Ishwardeep Singh, Ujjwalpreet Pant, Chinmay Prawah Cryptography and Security Polymorphic malware continually alters its structure to evade signature-based defences, challenging both commercial antivirus (AV) and enterprise detection systems. This study introduces a reproducible framework for analysing eight polymorphic behaviours-junk code insertion, control-flow obfuscation, packing, data encoding, domain generation, randomized beacon timing, protocol mimicry, and format/header tweaks-and evaluates their detectability across three layers: commercial AVs, custom rule-based detectors (YARA/Sigma), and endpoint detection and response (EDR) telemetry. Eleven inert polymorphic variants were generated per behaviour using controlled mutation engines and executed in isolated environments. Detection performance was assessed by detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and combined coverage. AVs achieved an average DR of 34%, YARA/Sigma 74% and EDR 76%; integrated detection reached ~92% with an FPR of 3.5%. Iterative YARA tuning showed a trade-off between detection and FPR, while behaviour-specific trends revealed static polymorphisms were best caught by custom rules, dynamic by EDR, and network-level by Sigma-like analysis. These results affirm that hybrid detection pipelines combining static, dynamic, and network-layer analytics offer resilient defence against polymorphic malware and form a baseline for future adaptive detection research. |
| title | Adaptive Detection of Polymorphic Malware: Leveraging Mutation Engines and YARA Rules for Enhanced Security |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.21764 |