Beyond Membership: Limitations of Add/Remove Adjacency in Differential Privacy
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866910106503872512 |
|---|---|
| author | Pradhan, Gauri Jälkö, Joonas Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago Honkela, Antti |
| author_facet | Pradhan, Gauri Jälkö, Joonas Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago Honkela, Antti |
| contents | Training machine learning models with differential privacy (DP) limits an adversary's ability to infer sensitive information about the training data. It can be interpreted as a bound on adversary's capability to distinguish two adjacent datasets according to chosen adjacency relation. In practice, most DP implementations use the add/remove adjacency relation, where two datasets are adjacent if one can be obtained from the other by adding or removing a single record, thereby protecting membership. In many ML applications, however, the goal is to protect attributes of individual records (e.g., labels used in supervised fine-tuning). We show that privacy accounting under add/remove overstates attribute privacy compared to accounting under the substitute adjacency relation, which permits substituting one record. To demonstrate this gap, we develop novel attacks to audit DP under substitute adjacency, and show empirically that audit results are inconsistent with DP guarantees reported under add/remove, yet remain consistent with the budget accounted under the substitute adjacency relation. Our results highlight that the choice of adjacency when reporting DP guarantees is critical when the protection target is per-record attributes rather than membership. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_21804 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Beyond Membership: Limitations of Add/Remove Adjacency in Differential Privacy Pradhan, Gauri Jälkö, Joonas Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago Honkela, Antti Cryptography and Security Machine Learning Training machine learning models with differential privacy (DP) limits an adversary's ability to infer sensitive information about the training data. It can be interpreted as a bound on adversary's capability to distinguish two adjacent datasets according to chosen adjacency relation. In practice, most DP implementations use the add/remove adjacency relation, where two datasets are adjacent if one can be obtained from the other by adding or removing a single record, thereby protecting membership. In many ML applications, however, the goal is to protect attributes of individual records (e.g., labels used in supervised fine-tuning). We show that privacy accounting under add/remove overstates attribute privacy compared to accounting under the substitute adjacency relation, which permits substituting one record. To demonstrate this gap, we develop novel attacks to audit DP under substitute adjacency, and show empirically that audit results are inconsistent with DP guarantees reported under add/remove, yet remain consistent with the budget accounted under the substitute adjacency relation. Our results highlight that the choice of adjacency when reporting DP guarantees is critical when the protection target is per-record attributes rather than membership. |
| title | Beyond Membership: Limitations of Add/Remove Adjacency in Differential Privacy |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.21804 |