Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909931567841280 |
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| author | Papasotiropoulos, Georgios Pishbin, Zein |
| author_facet | Papasotiropoulos, Georgios Pishbin, Zein |
| contents | This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice -- such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule -- and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_23097 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem Papasotiropoulos, Georgios Pishbin, Zein Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice -- such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule -- and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation. |
| title | Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.23097 |