Assertion-Conditioned Compliance: A Provenance-Aware Vulnerability in Multi-Turn Tool-Calling Agents

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Waqas, Daud, Golthi, Aaryamaan, Hayashida, Erika, Mao, Huanzhi
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Waqas, Daud
Golthi, Aaryamaan
Hayashida, Erika
Mao, Huanzhi
author_facet Waqas, Daud
Golthi, Aaryamaan
Hayashida, Erika
Mao, Huanzhi
contents Multi-turn tool-calling LLMs (models capable of invoking external APIs or tools across several user turns) have emerged as a key feature in modern AI assistants, enabling extended dialogues from benign tasks to critical business, medical, and financial operations. Yet implementing multi-turn pipelines remains difficult for many safety-critical industries due to ongoing concerns regarding model resilience. While standardized benchmarks such as the Berkeley Function-Calling Leaderboard (BFCL) have underpinned confidence concerning advanced function-calling models (like Salesforce's xLAM V2), there is still a lack of visibility into multi-turn conversation-level robustness, especially given their exposure to real-world systems. In this paper, we introduce Assertion-Conditioned Compliance (A-CC), a novel evaluation paradigm for multi-turn function-calling dialogues. A-CC provides holistic metrics that evaluate a model's behavior when confronted with misleading assertions originating from two distinct vectors: (1) user-sourced assertions (USAs), which measure sycophancy toward plausible but misinformed user beliefs, and (2) function-sourced assertions (FSAs), which measure compliance with plausible but contradictory system policies (e.g., stale hints from unmaintained tools). Our results show that models are highly vulnerable to both USA sycophancy and FSA policy conflicts, confirming A-CC as a critical, latent vulnerability in deployed agents.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_00332
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Assertion-Conditioned Compliance: A Provenance-Aware Vulnerability in Multi-Turn Tool-Calling Agents
Waqas, Daud
Golthi, Aaryamaan
Hayashida, Erika
Mao, Huanzhi
Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-turn tool-calling LLMs (models capable of invoking external APIs or tools across several user turns) have emerged as a key feature in modern AI assistants, enabling extended dialogues from benign tasks to critical business, medical, and financial operations. Yet implementing multi-turn pipelines remains difficult for many safety-critical industries due to ongoing concerns regarding model resilience. While standardized benchmarks such as the Berkeley Function-Calling Leaderboard (BFCL) have underpinned confidence concerning advanced function-calling models (like Salesforce's xLAM V2), there is still a lack of visibility into multi-turn conversation-level robustness, especially given their exposure to real-world systems. In this paper, we introduce Assertion-Conditioned Compliance (A-CC), a novel evaluation paradigm for multi-turn function-calling dialogues. A-CC provides holistic metrics that evaluate a model's behavior when confronted with misleading assertions originating from two distinct vectors: (1) user-sourced assertions (USAs), which measure sycophancy toward plausible but misinformed user beliefs, and (2) function-sourced assertions (FSAs), which measure compliance with plausible but contradictory system policies (e.g., stale hints from unmaintained tools). Our results show that models are highly vulnerable to both USA sycophancy and FSA policy conflicts, confirming A-CC as a critical, latent vulnerability in deployed agents.
title Assertion-Conditioned Compliance: A Provenance-Aware Vulnerability in Multi-Turn Tool-Calling Agents
topic Computation and Language
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00332