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Stable Voting and the Splitting of Cycles

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Holliday, Wesley H., Mossé, Milan, Norman, Chase, Pacuit, Eric, Wang, Cynthia
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Theoretical Economics 91B12, 91B14, 91B10 I.2.11; I.2.3
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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