Games with infinite past
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908683616649216 |
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| author | Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit Flesch, János Solan, Eilon |
| author_facet | Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit Flesch, János Solan, Eilon |
| contents | We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations at finitely many stages and another considering all deviations. We show that (i) The sets of equilibrium plays coincide for the two equilibrium concepts, provided that at least two players are active along each infinite play. (ii) In win-lose games, the game has an equilibrium if the winning sets have Borel-rank at most 2, and we provide a counter-example showing that this is no longer true for Borel-rank 3. (iii) In general non-zero-sum games, the game has an equilibrium if the payoff functions are continuous, for example, with reversed-time discounted payoffs. The challenge for all these results is that not all strategy profiles admit a consistent infinite play, hampering the use of backward induction arguments. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_01001 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Games with infinite past Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit Flesch, János Solan, Eilon Optimization and Control Logic 91A06, 91A10, 91A20, 91A25, 91A44, 91A50 We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations at finitely many stages and another considering all deviations. We show that (i) The sets of equilibrium plays coincide for the two equilibrium concepts, provided that at least two players are active along each infinite play. (ii) In win-lose games, the game has an equilibrium if the winning sets have Borel-rank at most 2, and we provide a counter-example showing that this is no longer true for Borel-rank 3. (iii) In general non-zero-sum games, the game has an equilibrium if the payoff functions are continuous, for example, with reversed-time discounted payoffs. The challenge for all these results is that not all strategy profiles admit a consistent infinite play, hampering the use of backward induction arguments. |
| title | Games with infinite past |
| topic | Optimization and Control Logic 91A06, 91A10, 91A20, 91A25, 91A44, 91A50 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01001 |