The Polarization Effect of Monopsonistic Lobbying
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866918226067193856 |
|---|---|
| author | Shum, Peter |
| author_facet | Shum, Peter |
| contents | Classical spatial models predict platform convergence, yet empirical polarization persists. This paper proposes a non-electoral mechanism: lobbying as a monopsonistic market for legislative support. Here, extreme benefactors must pay more to attract distant politicians, creating a rent gradient that rewards platform differentiation. We find that the unique equilibrium places politicians at $(\frac{1}{4},\frac{3}{4})$ for any monotone policy-production cost. Thus, polarization can arise solely from lobbying-market structure, independent of electoral incentives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_01796 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Polarization Effect of Monopsonistic Lobbying Shum, Peter Theoretical Economics 91B10, 91B12, 91B24 Classical spatial models predict platform convergence, yet empirical polarization persists. This paper proposes a non-electoral mechanism: lobbying as a monopsonistic market for legislative support. Here, extreme benefactors must pay more to attract distant politicians, creating a rent gradient that rewards platform differentiation. We find that the unique equilibrium places politicians at $(\frac{1}{4},\frac{3}{4})$ for any monotone policy-production cost. Thus, polarization can arise solely from lobbying-market structure, independent of electoral incentives. |
| title | The Polarization Effect of Monopsonistic Lobbying |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91B10, 91B12, 91B24 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01796 |