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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03519 |
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| _version_ | 1866908690619039744 |
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| author | Larwood, Ben Sutton, Oliver J. Cockburn, Callum |
| author_facet | Larwood, Ben Sutton, Oliver J. Cockburn, Callum |
| contents | Developing high-stakes autonomous systems that include Artificial Intelligence (AI) components is complex; the consequences of errors can be catastrophic, yet it is challenging to plan for all operational cases. In stressful scenarios for the human operator, such as short decision-making timescales, the risk of failures is exacerbated. A lack of understanding of AI failure modes obstructs this and so blocks the robust implementation of applications of AI in smart systems. This prevents early risk identification, leading to increased time, risk and cost of projects.
A key tenet of Systems Engineering and acquisition engineering is centred around a "left-shift" in test and evaluation activities to earlier in the system lifecycle, to allow for "accelerated delivery of [systems] that work". We argue it is therefore essential that this shift includes the analysis of AI failure cases as part of the design stages of the system life cycle. Our proposed framework enables the early characterisation of risks emerging from human-autonomy teaming (HAT) in operational contexts. The cornerstone of this is a new analysis of AI failure modes, built on the seminal modelling of human-autonomy teams laid out by LaMonica et al., 2022. Using the analysis of the interactions between human and autonomous systems and exploring the failure modes within each aspect, our approach provides a way to systematically identify human-AI interactions risks across the operational domain of the system of interest. The understanding of the emergent behaviour enables increased robustness of the system, for which the analysis should be undertaken over the whole scope of its operational design domain. This approach is illustrated through an example use case for an AI assistant supporting a Command & Control (C2) System. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_03519 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Left shifting analysis of Human-Autonomous Team interactions to analyse risks of autonomy in high-stakes AI systems Larwood, Ben Sutton, Oliver J. Cockburn, Callum Human-Computer Interaction Systems and Control H.5.0 Developing high-stakes autonomous systems that include Artificial Intelligence (AI) components is complex; the consequences of errors can be catastrophic, yet it is challenging to plan for all operational cases. In stressful scenarios for the human operator, such as short decision-making timescales, the risk of failures is exacerbated. A lack of understanding of AI failure modes obstructs this and so blocks the robust implementation of applications of AI in smart systems. This prevents early risk identification, leading to increased time, risk and cost of projects. A key tenet of Systems Engineering and acquisition engineering is centred around a "left-shift" in test and evaluation activities to earlier in the system lifecycle, to allow for "accelerated delivery of [systems] that work". We argue it is therefore essential that this shift includes the analysis of AI failure cases as part of the design stages of the system life cycle. Our proposed framework enables the early characterisation of risks emerging from human-autonomy teaming (HAT) in operational contexts. The cornerstone of this is a new analysis of AI failure modes, built on the seminal modelling of human-autonomy teams laid out by LaMonica et al., 2022. Using the analysis of the interactions between human and autonomous systems and exploring the failure modes within each aspect, our approach provides a way to systematically identify human-AI interactions risks across the operational domain of the system of interest. The understanding of the emergent behaviour enables increased robustness of the system, for which the analysis should be undertaken over the whole scope of its operational design domain. This approach is illustrated through an example use case for an AI assistant supporting a Command & Control (C2) System. |
| title | Left shifting analysis of Human-Autonomous Team interactions to analyse risks of autonomy in high-stakes AI systems |
| topic | Human-Computer Interaction Systems and Control H.5.0 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03519 |