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| Natura: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03765 |
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| _version_ | 1866915651496443904 |
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| author | Puente, Jose E. Puente, Carlos |
| author_facet | Puente, Jose E. Puente, Carlos |
| contents | Public companies and institutional investors that hold Bitcoin face increasing pressure to show solvency, manage risk, and satisfy regulatory expectations without exposing internal wallet structures or trading strategies. This paper introduces the Treasury Proof Ledger (TPL), a Bitcoin-anchored logging framework for multi-domain Bitcoin treasuries that treats on-chain and off-chain exposures as a conserved state machine with an explicit fee sink. A TPL instance records proof-of-reserves snapshots, proof-of-transit receipts for movements between domains, and policy metadata, and it supports restricted views based on stakeholder permissions. We define an idealised TPL model, represent Bitcoin treasuries as multi-domain exposure vectors, and give deployment-level security notions including exposure soundness, policy completeness, non-equivocation, and privacy-compatible policy views. We then outline how practical, restricted forms of these guarantees can be achieved by combining standard proof-of-reserves and proof-of-transit techniques with hash-based commitments anchored on Bitcoin. The results are existence-type statements: they show which guarantees are achievable once economic and governance assumptions are set, without claiming that any current system already provides them. A stylised corporate-treasury example illustrates how TPL could support responsible transparency policies and future cross-institution checks consistent with Bitcoin's fixed monetary supply. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_03765 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Treasury Proof Ledger: A Cryptographic Framework for Accountable Bitcoin Treasuries Puente, Jose E. Puente, Carlos Cryptography and Security Public companies and institutional investors that hold Bitcoin face increasing pressure to show solvency, manage risk, and satisfy regulatory expectations without exposing internal wallet structures or trading strategies. This paper introduces the Treasury Proof Ledger (TPL), a Bitcoin-anchored logging framework for multi-domain Bitcoin treasuries that treats on-chain and off-chain exposures as a conserved state machine with an explicit fee sink. A TPL instance records proof-of-reserves snapshots, proof-of-transit receipts for movements between domains, and policy metadata, and it supports restricted views based on stakeholder permissions. We define an idealised TPL model, represent Bitcoin treasuries as multi-domain exposure vectors, and give deployment-level security notions including exposure soundness, policy completeness, non-equivocation, and privacy-compatible policy views. We then outline how practical, restricted forms of these guarantees can be achieved by combining standard proof-of-reserves and proof-of-transit techniques with hash-based commitments anchored on Bitcoin. The results are existence-type statements: they show which guarantees are achievable once economic and governance assumptions are set, without claiming that any current system already provides them. A stylised corporate-treasury example illustrates how TPL could support responsible transparency policies and future cross-institution checks consistent with Bitcoin's fixed monetary supply. |
| title | The Treasury Proof Ledger: A Cryptographic Framework for Accountable Bitcoin Treasuries |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.03765 |