From informal markets to Limit Order Book dynamics: a mean field connection

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Navarro-Rubio, Alvaro, Lage-Castellanos, Alejandro
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Navarro-Rubio, Alvaro
Lage-Castellanos, Alejandro
author_facet Navarro-Rubio, Alvaro
Lage-Castellanos, Alejandro
contents We propose a unified mean-field framework that bridges the dynamics of informal financial markets and formal markets governed by Limit Order Books (LOBs). Both settings are modeled as interacting particle systems on a 1D price lattice, with temporal evolution described by master equations that account for new entries, cancellations, and executions. The key insight is the introduction of a preferential interaction parameter $Ψ$, which modulates the likelihood of transactions based on price compatibility: when $Ψ=0$, interactions are random and uncoordinated, reproducing the structure of informal markets; as $Ψ\to \infty$, only optimal (most mutually attractive) trades occur, recovering LOB-like dynamics. A grand-canonical interpretation is used to identify effective thermodynamic quantities -such as interaction energy and price-dependent chemical potentials -that underlie both systems. Most results are validated through numerical integration and simulations, although an analytical solution is shown to exist at least for the symmetric stationary case of the informal market.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_04440
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle From informal markets to Limit Order Book dynamics: a mean field connection
Navarro-Rubio, Alvaro
Lage-Castellanos, Alejandro
Statistical Mechanics
We propose a unified mean-field framework that bridges the dynamics of informal financial markets and formal markets governed by Limit Order Books (LOBs). Both settings are modeled as interacting particle systems on a 1D price lattice, with temporal evolution described by master equations that account for new entries, cancellations, and executions. The key insight is the introduction of a preferential interaction parameter $Ψ$, which modulates the likelihood of transactions based on price compatibility: when $Ψ=0$, interactions are random and uncoordinated, reproducing the structure of informal markets; as $Ψ\to \infty$, only optimal (most mutually attractive) trades occur, recovering LOB-like dynamics. A grand-canonical interpretation is used to identify effective thermodynamic quantities -such as interaction energy and price-dependent chemical potentials -that underlie both systems. Most results are validated through numerical integration and simulations, although an analytical solution is shown to exist at least for the symmetric stationary case of the informal market.
title From informal markets to Limit Order Book dynamics: a mean field connection
topic Statistical Mechanics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.04440