Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs
Fuente:
arXiv
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| _version_ | 1866915658074161152 |
|---|---|
| author | Renault, Jérôme Solan, Eilon Vieille, Nicolas |
| author_facet | Renault, Jérôme Solan, Eilon Vieille, Nicolas |
| contents | We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly observed. In addition, for pure equilibria, the equilibrium amount of experimentation is at least socially optimal, and possibly higher. We provide a tight bound on the degree of over-experimentation. The analysis rests on a new form of encouragement effect, according to which a player may hide the absence of a success to encourage future experimentation by the other player, which incentivizes current experimentation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_06180 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs Renault, Jérôme Solan, Eilon Vieille, Nicolas Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control 91A25, 91A05 We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly observed. In addition, for pure equilibria, the equilibrium amount of experimentation is at least socially optimal, and possibly higher. We provide a tight bound on the degree of over-experimentation. The analysis rests on a new form of encouragement effect, according to which a player may hide the absence of a success to encourage future experimentation by the other player, which incentivizes current experimentation. |
| title | Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Optimization and Control 91A25, 91A05 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06180 |