How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915665812652032 |
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| author | Topaz, Chad M. |
| author_facet | Topaz, Chad M. |
| contents | We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes -- cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist--authoritarian coalition excluding resistance -- depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_06245 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach Topaz, Chad M. Physics and Society Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems Populations and Evolution We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Such conflicts are often asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger normative constraints on acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game. This framework yields two outcomes -- cyclic authoritarian resurgence through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist--authoritarian coalition excluding resistance -- depending on confrontation responses. We demonstrate how an established dynamical framework with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions clarifies conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance. |
| title | How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach |
| topic | Physics and Society Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems Populations and Evolution |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06245 |