Beyond Model Jailbreak: Systematic Dissection of the "Ten DeadlySins" in Embodied Intelligence
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914184985313280 |
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| author | Huang, Yuhang Li, Junchao Ma, Boyang Dai, Xuelong Xu, Minghui Xu, Kaidi Zhang, Yue Wang, Jianping Cheng, Xiuzhen |
| author_facet | Huang, Yuhang Li, Junchao Ma, Boyang Dai, Xuelong Xu, Minghui Xu, Kaidi Zhang, Yue Wang, Jianping Cheng, Xiuzhen |
| contents | Embodied AI systems integrate language models with real world sensing, mobility, and cloud connected mobile apps. Yet while model jailbreaks have drawn significant attention, the broader system stack of embodied intelligence remains largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct the first holistic security analysis of the Unitree Go2 platform and uncover ten cross layer vulnerabilities the "Ten Sins of Embodied AI Security." Using BLE sniffing, traffic interception, APK reverse engineering, cloud API testing, and hardware probing, we identify systemic weaknesses across three architectural layers: wireless provisioning, core modules, and external interfaces. These include hard coded keys, predictable handshake tokens, WiFi credential leakage, missing TLS validation, static SSH password, multilingual safety bypass behavior, insecure local relay channels, weak binding logic, and unrestricted firmware access. Together, they allow adversaries to hijack devices, inject arbitrary commands, extract sensitive information, or gain full physical control.Our findings show that securing embodied AI requires far more than aligning the model itself. We conclude with system level lessons learned and recommendations for building embodied platforms that remain robust across their entire software hardware ecosystem. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_06387 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Beyond Model Jailbreak: Systematic Dissection of the "Ten DeadlySins" in Embodied Intelligence Huang, Yuhang Li, Junchao Ma, Boyang Dai, Xuelong Xu, Minghui Xu, Kaidi Zhang, Yue Wang, Jianping Cheng, Xiuzhen Cryptography and Security Robotics Embodied AI systems integrate language models with real world sensing, mobility, and cloud connected mobile apps. Yet while model jailbreaks have drawn significant attention, the broader system stack of embodied intelligence remains largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct the first holistic security analysis of the Unitree Go2 platform and uncover ten cross layer vulnerabilities the "Ten Sins of Embodied AI Security." Using BLE sniffing, traffic interception, APK reverse engineering, cloud API testing, and hardware probing, we identify systemic weaknesses across three architectural layers: wireless provisioning, core modules, and external interfaces. These include hard coded keys, predictable handshake tokens, WiFi credential leakage, missing TLS validation, static SSH password, multilingual safety bypass behavior, insecure local relay channels, weak binding logic, and unrestricted firmware access. Together, they allow adversaries to hijack devices, inject arbitrary commands, extract sensitive information, or gain full physical control.Our findings show that securing embodied AI requires far more than aligning the model itself. We conclude with system level lessons learned and recommendations for building embodied platforms that remain robust across their entire software hardware ecosystem. |
| title | Beyond Model Jailbreak: Systematic Dissection of the "Ten DeadlySins" in Embodied Intelligence |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Robotics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06387 |