Formalisation of Security for Federated Learning with DP and Attacker Advantage in IIIf for Satellite Swarms -- Extended Version

Fuente: arXiv
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Autor principal: Kammüller, Florian
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Kammüller, Florian
author_facet Kammüller, Florian
contents In distributed applications, like swarms of satellites, machine learning can be efficiently applied even on small devices by using Federated Learning (FL). This allows to reduce the learning complexity by transmitting only updates to the general model in the server in the form of differences in stochastic gradient descent. FL naturally supports differential privacy but new attacks, so called Data Leakage from Gradient (DLG) have been discovered recently. There has been work on defenses against DLG but there is a lack of foundation and rigorous evaluation of their security. In the current work, we extend existing work on a formal notion of Differential Privacy for Federated Learning distributed dynamic systems and relate it to the notion of the attacker advantage. This formalisation is carried out within the Isabelle Insider and Infrastructure framework (IIIf) allowing the machine supported verification of theory and applications within the proof assistant Isabelle. Satellite swarm systems are used as a motivating use case but also as a validation case study.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_06467
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Formalisation of Security for Federated Learning with DP and Attacker Advantage in IIIf for Satellite Swarms -- Extended Version
Kammüller, Florian
Cryptography and Security
Logic in Computer Science
In distributed applications, like swarms of satellites, machine learning can be efficiently applied even on small devices by using Federated Learning (FL). This allows to reduce the learning complexity by transmitting only updates to the general model in the server in the form of differences in stochastic gradient descent. FL naturally supports differential privacy but new attacks, so called Data Leakage from Gradient (DLG) have been discovered recently. There has been work on defenses against DLG but there is a lack of foundation and rigorous evaluation of their security. In the current work, we extend existing work on a formal notion of Differential Privacy for Federated Learning distributed dynamic systems and relate it to the notion of the attacker advantage. This formalisation is carried out within the Isabelle Insider and Infrastructure framework (IIIf) allowing the machine supported verification of theory and applications within the proof assistant Isabelle. Satellite swarm systems are used as a motivating use case but also as a validation case study.
title Formalisation of Security for Federated Learning with DP and Attacker Advantage in IIIf for Satellite Swarms -- Extended Version
topic Cryptography and Security
Logic in Computer Science
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06467