The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Qiu, Frederick V., Weinberg, S. Matthew, Zhang, Qianfan |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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