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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06794 |
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| _version_ | 1866911306344300544 |
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| author | Shaiderman, Dimitry |
| author_facet | Shaiderman, Dimitry |
| contents | We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model called Markovian persuasion. In such a model, the belief of the receiver regarding the current state of a Markov chain $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$, over a finite state space $K$, is controlled through signals she obtains from a sender, who observes $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ in real time. At each stage $n\geq 1$, the receiver takes an action based on his current belief, which together with the realized state of $X_n$, determines the $n$'th stage payoff of the sender. The sender's goal in a Markovian persuasion game is to find a signaling policy that maximizes her expected $δ$-discounted sum of stage payoffs for a discount factor $δ\in [0,1)$. We show that starting from any invariant distribution $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ the trajectory of the $δ$-discounted value is a monotone decreasing in $δ$. By combining this result with the opposite increasing monotone trajectories found in Lehrer and S.\ (2025, GEB), we are able to derive an upper bound on the rate of convergence of the $δ$-discounted values (as $δ\to 1^-$) in the case where $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ is ergodic. The results for the Markovian persuasion model are then extended to the Markov chain games model of Renault (2006, MOR). |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_06794 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Monotonicity and Rate of Convergence of the Markovian Persuasion Value Shaiderman, Dimitry Optimization and Control 91A25, 91A27, 91A28 We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion model called Markovian persuasion. In such a model, the belief of the receiver regarding the current state of a Markov chain $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$, over a finite state space $K$, is controlled through signals she obtains from a sender, who observes $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ in real time. At each stage $n\geq 1$, the receiver takes an action based on his current belief, which together with the realized state of $X_n$, determines the $n$'th stage payoff of the sender. The sender's goal in a Markovian persuasion game is to find a signaling policy that maximizes her expected $δ$-discounted sum of stage payoffs for a discount factor $δ\in [0,1)$. We show that starting from any invariant distribution $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ the trajectory of the $δ$-discounted value is a monotone decreasing in $δ$. By combining this result with the opposite increasing monotone trajectories found in Lehrer and S.\ (2025, GEB), we are able to derive an upper bound on the rate of convergence of the $δ$-discounted values (as $δ\to 1^-$) in the case where $(X_n)_{n\geq 1}$ is ergodic. The results for the Markovian persuasion model are then extended to the Markov chain games model of Renault (2006, MOR). |
| title | On the Monotonicity and Rate of Convergence of the Markovian Persuasion Value |
| topic | Optimization and Control 91A25, 91A27, 91A28 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.06794 |