Privacy Practices of Browser Agents

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Ukani, Alisha, Haddadi, Hamed, Shamsabadi, Ali Shahin, Snyder, Peter
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Ukani, Alisha
Haddadi, Hamed
Shamsabadi, Ali Shahin
Snyder, Peter
author_facet Ukani, Alisha
Haddadi, Hamed
Shamsabadi, Ali Shahin
Snyder, Peter
contents This paper presents a systematic evaluation of the privacy behaviors and attributes of eight recent, popular browser agents. Browser agents are software that automate Web browsing using large language models and ancillary tooling. However, the automated capabilities that make browser agents powerful also make them high-risk points of failure. Both the kinds of tasks browser agents are designed to execute, along with the kinds of information browser agents are entrusted with to fulfill those tasks, mean that vulnerabilities in these tools can result in enormous privacy harm. This work presents a framework of five broad factors (totaling 15 distinct measurements) to measure the privacy risks in browser agents. Our framework assesses i. vulnerabilities in the browser agent's components, ii. how the browser agent protects against website behaviors, iii. whether the browser agent prevents cross-site tracking, iv. how the agent responds to privacy-affecting prompts, and v. whether the tool leaks personal information to sites. We apply our framework to eight browser agents and identify 30 vulnerabilities, ranging from disabled browser privacy features to "autocompleting" sensitive personal information in form fields. We have responsibly disclosed our findings, and plan to release our dataset and other artifacts.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_07725
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Privacy Practices of Browser Agents
Ukani, Alisha
Haddadi, Hamed
Shamsabadi, Ali Shahin
Snyder, Peter
Cryptography and Security
This paper presents a systematic evaluation of the privacy behaviors and attributes of eight recent, popular browser agents. Browser agents are software that automate Web browsing using large language models and ancillary tooling. However, the automated capabilities that make browser agents powerful also make them high-risk points of failure. Both the kinds of tasks browser agents are designed to execute, along with the kinds of information browser agents are entrusted with to fulfill those tasks, mean that vulnerabilities in these tools can result in enormous privacy harm. This work presents a framework of five broad factors (totaling 15 distinct measurements) to measure the privacy risks in browser agents. Our framework assesses i. vulnerabilities in the browser agent's components, ii. how the browser agent protects against website behaviors, iii. whether the browser agent prevents cross-site tracking, iv. how the agent responds to privacy-affecting prompts, and v. whether the tool leaks personal information to sites. We apply our framework to eight browser agents and identify 30 vulnerabilities, ranging from disabled browser privacy features to "autocompleting" sensitive personal information in form fields. We have responsibly disclosed our findings, and plan to release our dataset and other artifacts.
title Privacy Practices of Browser Agents
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.07725