Optimal strategy against straightforward bidding in clock auctions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866915666521489408 |
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| author | Zeroual, Jad Akian, Marianne Bechler, Aurélien Chardy, Matthieu Gaubert, Stéphane |
| author_facet | Zeroual, Jad Akian, Marianne Bechler, Aurélien Chardy, Matthieu Gaubert, Stéphane |
| contents | We study a model of auction representative of the 5G auction in France. We determine the optimal strategy of a bidder, assuming that the valuations of competitors are unknown to this bidder and that competitors adopt the straightforward bidding strategy. Our model is based on a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). This POMDP admits a concise statistics, avoiding the solution of a dynamic programming equation in the space of beliefs. In addition, under this optimal strategy, the expected gain of the bidder does not decrease if competitors deviate from straightforward bidding. We illustrate our results by numerical experiments, comparing the value of the bidder with the value of a perfectly informed one. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_09788 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimal strategy against straightforward bidding in clock auctions Zeroual, Jad Akian, Marianne Bechler, Aurélien Chardy, Matthieu Gaubert, Stéphane Optimization and Control We study a model of auction representative of the 5G auction in France. We determine the optimal strategy of a bidder, assuming that the valuations of competitors are unknown to this bidder and that competitors adopt the straightforward bidding strategy. Our model is based on a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). This POMDP admits a concise statistics, avoiding the solution of a dynamic programming equation in the space of beliefs. In addition, under this optimal strategy, the expected gain of the bidder does not decrease if competitors deviate from straightforward bidding. We illustrate our results by numerical experiments, comparing the value of the bidder with the value of a perfectly informed one. |
| title | Optimal strategy against straightforward bidding in clock auctions |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.09788 |