The Moroccan Public Procurement Game
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866916044132581376 |
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| author | Riane, Nizar |
| author_facet | Riane, Nizar |
| contents | In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we establish the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying an extended version of Dasgupta and Maskin result, which allows us to extend equilibrium existence to the mixed-strategy setting despite payoff discontinuities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_10109 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Moroccan Public Procurement Game Riane, Nizar Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we establish the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying an extended version of Dasgupta and Maskin result, which allows us to extend equilibrium existence to the mixed-strategy setting despite payoff discontinuities. |
| title | The Moroccan Public Procurement Game |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.10109 |