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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.10470 |
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| _version_ | 1866908705061076992 |
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| author | Bacztub, Kaleb Vester, Braden Hodge, Matteo Abate, Liulseged |
| author_facet | Bacztub, Kaleb Vester, Braden Hodge, Matteo Abate, Liulseged |
| contents | Wireless networks act as the backbone of modern digital connectivity, making them a primary target for cyber adversaries. Rogue Access Point attacks, specifically the Evil Twin variant, enable attackers to clone legitimate wireless network identifiers to deceive users into connecting. Once a connection is established, the adversary can intercept traffic and harvest sensitive credentials. While modern defensive architectures often employ Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) to identify malicious activity, the effectiveness of these systems against Layer 2 wireless threats remains a subject of critical inquiry. This project aimed to design a stealth-capable Rogue AP and evaluate its detectability against Suricata, an open-source NIDS/IPS. The methodology initially focused on a hardware-based deployment using Raspberry Pi platforms but transitioned to a virtualized environment due to severe system compatibility issues. Using Wifipumpkin3, the research team successfully deployed a captive portal that harvested user credentials from connected devices. However, the Suricata NIDS failed to flag the attack, highlighting a significant blind spot in traditional intrusion detection regarding wireless management frame attacks. This paper details the construction of the attack, the evasion techniques employed, and the limitations of current NIDS solutions in detecting localized wireless threats |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_10470 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stealth and Evasion in Rogue AP Attacks: An Analysis of Modern Detection and Bypass Techniques Bacztub, Kaleb Vester, Braden Hodge, Matteo Abate, Liulseged Cryptography and Security Wireless networks act as the backbone of modern digital connectivity, making them a primary target for cyber adversaries. Rogue Access Point attacks, specifically the Evil Twin variant, enable attackers to clone legitimate wireless network identifiers to deceive users into connecting. Once a connection is established, the adversary can intercept traffic and harvest sensitive credentials. While modern defensive architectures often employ Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) to identify malicious activity, the effectiveness of these systems against Layer 2 wireless threats remains a subject of critical inquiry. This project aimed to design a stealth-capable Rogue AP and evaluate its detectability against Suricata, an open-source NIDS/IPS. The methodology initially focused on a hardware-based deployment using Raspberry Pi platforms but transitioned to a virtualized environment due to severe system compatibility issues. Using Wifipumpkin3, the research team successfully deployed a captive portal that harvested user credentials from connected devices. However, the Suricata NIDS failed to flag the attack, highlighting a significant blind spot in traditional intrusion detection regarding wireless management frame attacks. This paper details the construction of the attack, the evasion techniques employed, and the limitations of current NIDS solutions in detecting localized wireless threats |
| title | Stealth and Evasion in Rogue AP Attacks: An Analysis of Modern Detection and Bypass Techniques |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.10470 |