TriHaRd: Higher Resilience for TEE Trusted Time
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| author | Bettinger, Matthieu Mokhtar, Sonia Ben Felber, Pascal Rivière, Etienne Schiavoni, Valerio Simonet-Boulogne, Anthony |
| author_facet | Bettinger, Matthieu Mokhtar, Sonia Ben Felber, Pascal Rivière, Etienne Schiavoni, Valerio Simonet-Boulogne, Anthony |
| contents | Accurately measuring time passing is critical for many applications. However, in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX, the time source is outside the Trusted Computing Base: a malicious host can manipulate the TEE's notion of time, jumping in time or affecting perceived time speed. Previous work (Triad) proposes protocols for TEEs to maintain a trustworthy time source by building a cluster of TEEs that collaborate with each other and with a remote Time Authority to maintain a continuous notion of passing time. However, such approaches still allow an attacker to control the operating system and arbitrarily manipulate their own TEE's perceived clock speed. An attacker can even propagate faster passage of time to honest machines participating in Triad's trusted time protocol, causing them to skip to timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. We propose TriHaRd, a TEE trusted time protocol achieving high resilience against clock speed and offset manipulations, notably through Byzantine-resilient clock updates and consistency checks. We empirically show that TriHaRd mitigates known attacks against Triad. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_10732 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | TriHaRd: Higher Resilience for TEE Trusted Time Bettinger, Matthieu Mokhtar, Sonia Ben Felber, Pascal Rivière, Etienne Schiavoni, Valerio Simonet-Boulogne, Anthony Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Accurately measuring time passing is critical for many applications. However, in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX, the time source is outside the Trusted Computing Base: a malicious host can manipulate the TEE's notion of time, jumping in time or affecting perceived time speed. Previous work (Triad) proposes protocols for TEEs to maintain a trustworthy time source by building a cluster of TEEs that collaborate with each other and with a remote Time Authority to maintain a continuous notion of passing time. However, such approaches still allow an attacker to control the operating system and arbitrarily manipulate their own TEE's perceived clock speed. An attacker can even propagate faster passage of time to honest machines participating in Triad's trusted time protocol, causing them to skip to timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. We propose TriHaRd, a TEE trusted time protocol achieving high resilience against clock speed and offset manipulations, notably through Byzantine-resilient clock updates and consistency checks. We empirically show that TriHaRd mitigates known attacks against Triad. |
| title | TriHaRd: Higher Resilience for TEE Trusted Time |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.10732 |