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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11739 |
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| _version_ | 1866908731602632704 |
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| author | Levy, Amit Weinberg, S. Matthew Zhou, Chenghan |
| author_facet | Levy, Amit Weinberg, S. Matthew Zhou, Chenghan |
| contents | We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find:
- A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist).
- A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (a la [Mye81]), for existence of a ''market-clearing'' pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique.
- The market share of the largest miner is the relevant ''measure of decentralization'' to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists.
- Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist.
We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only ''patient'' users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas ''impatient'' users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_11739 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users Levy, Amit Weinberg, S. Matthew Zhou, Chenghan Computer Science and Game Theory We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our distributed ledger model, we find: - A characterization of all possible pure equilibria (although pure equilibria are not guaranteed to exist). - A natural sufficient condition, implied by Regularity (a la [Mye81]), for existence of a ''market-clearing'' pure equilibrium where Miners choose to sell all space allocated by the Distributed Ledger Protocol, and that this equilibrium is unique. - The market share of the largest miner is the relevant ''measure of decentralization'' to determine whether a market-clearing pure equilibrium exists. - Block rewards do not impact users' prices at equilibrium, when pure equilibria exist. But, higher block rewards can cause pure equilibria to exist. We also discuss aspects of our model and how they relate to blockchains deployed in practice. For example, only ''patient'' users (who are happy for their transactions to enter the blockchain under any miner) would enjoy the conclusions highlighted by our model, whereas ''impatient'' users (who are interested only for their transaction to be included in the very next block) still face monopoly pricing. |
| title | Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11739 |