Cover Image

Analyzing the Economic Impact of Decentralization on Users

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Levy, Amit, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Zhou, Chenghan
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection are Statistically Detectable
by: Cai, Linda, et al.
Published: (2024)

Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees
by: Qiu, Frederick V., et al.
Published: (2024)

Selfish Mining under General Stochastic Rewards
by: Bahrani, Maryam, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders
by: Qiu, Frederick V., et al.
Published: (2025)

Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items
by: Derakhshan, Mahsa, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum
by: Alpturer, Kaya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Hardness of Approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser Equilibria
by: Braverman, Mark, et al.
Published: (2026)

Stronger core results with multidimensional prices
by: Braverman, Mark, et al.
Published: (2026)

Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
by: Liu, Jingyi, et al.
Published: (2026)

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
by: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Adversarial procurement in blockchains
by: Bahrani, Maryam, et al.
Published: (2026)

Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
by: Ron, Shiri, et al.
Published: (2024)

Decentralized Fair Division
by: Miller, Joel, et al.
Published: (2024)

Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
by: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Published: (2025)

The Price of Decentralization in Block Building
by: Öz, Burak, et al.
Published: (2026)

Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples
by: Rubinstein, Aviad, et al.
Published: (2019)

Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games
by: Donahue, Kate, et al.
Published: (2024)

Balancing Participation and Decentralization in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies
by: Kiayias, Aggelos, et al.
Published: (2024)

Trial-and-Error Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets
by: Shah, Vade, et al.
Published: (2024)

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
by: Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, et al.
Published: (2025)

DECENT-BRM: Decentralization through Block Reward Mechanisms
by: Srivastava, Varul, et al.
Published: (2024)

Analyzing Crowdfunding of Public Projects Under Dynamic Beliefs
by: Damle, Sankarshan, et al.
Published: (2024)

A Unified Framework and Comparative Study of Decentralized Finance Derivatives Protocols
by: Pennella, Luca, et al.
Published: (2025)

Resilient and Efficient Allocation for Large-Scale Autonomous Fleets via Decentralized Coordination
by: Perukari, Ashish Kumar, et al.
Published: (2025)

Enhancing Decentralization in Blockchain Decision-Making Through Quadratic Voting and Its Generalization
by: Kovalchuk, Lyudmila, et al.
Published: (2025)

Proof of Sampling: A Nash Equilibrium-Based Verification Protocol for Decentralized Systems
by: Zhang, Yue, et al.
Published: (2024)

Economic Censorship Games in Fraud Proofs
by: Berger, Ben, et al.
Published: (2025)

V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
by: Gong, Tiantian, et al.
Published: (2024)

Robustness of Online Proportional Response in Stochastic Online Fisher Markets: a Decentralized Approach
by: Yang, Yongge, et al.
Published: (2024)

Economics Arena for Large Language Models
by: Guo, Shangmin, et al.
Published: (2024)

Robustness of Stable Matchings When Attributes and Salience Determine Preferences
by: Ronen, Amit, et al.
Published: (2026)

An Economic Framework for Generative Engines: Advertising or Subscription?
by: Zhang, Luyang, et al.
Published: (2026)

Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Bidding on the Reserve Capacity via a Bi-Level Model
by: Xu, Yun, et al.
Published: (2025)

A Control Theoretic Approach to Decentralized AI Economy Stabilization via Dynamic Buyback-and-Burn Mechanisms
by: Cheng, Zehua, et al.
Published: (2026)

Serial Monopoly on Blockchains with Quasi-patient Users
by: Penna, Paolo, et al.
Published: (2024)

Privacy Can Arise Endogenously in an Economic System with Learning Agents
by: Ananthakrishnan, Nivasini, et al.
Published: (2024)

TierDrop: Harnessing Airdrop Farmers for User Growth
by: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Published: (2024)

Rationally Analyzing Shelby: Proving Incentive Compatibility in a Decentralized Storage Network
by: Crystal, Michael, et al.
Published: (2025)

Modeling the Economic Impacts of AI Openness Regulation
by: Qiu, Tori, et al.
Published: (2025)

Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights
by: Feng, Di, et al.
Published: (2026)