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Autori principali:	Levy, Amit, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Zhou, Chenghan
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2025
Soggetti:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11739
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