Verification of Lightning Network Channel Balances with Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| author | Singh, Vikash Little, Barrett Hayes, Philip Fang, Max Khanzadeh, Matthew Killeen, Alyse Abbassi, Sam |
| author_facet | Singh, Vikash Little, Barrett Hayes, Philip Fang, Max Khanzadeh, Matthew Killeen, Alyse Abbassi, Sam |
| contents | Verifying the private liquidity state of Lightning Network (LN) channels is desirable for auditors, service providers, and network participants who need assurance of financial capacity. Current methods often lack robustness against a malicious or compromised node operator. This paper introduces a methodology for the verification of LN channel balances. The core contribution is a framework that combines Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) with Zero-Knowledge Transport Layer Security (zkTLS) to provide strong, hardware-backed guarantees. In our proposed method, the node's balance-reporting software runs within a TEE, which generates a remote attestation quote proving the software's integrity. This attestation is then served via an Application Programming Interface (API), and zkTLS is used to prove the authenticity of its delivery. We also analyze an alternative variant where the TEE signs the report directly without zkTLS, discussing the trade-offs between transport-layer verification and direct enclave signing. We further refine this by distinguishing between "Hot Proofs" (verifiable claims via TEEs) and "Cold Proofs" (on-chain settlement), and discuss critical security considerations including hardware vulnerabilities, privacy leakage to third-party APIs, and the performance overhead of enclaved operations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_12095 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Verification of Lightning Network Channel Balances with Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) Singh, Vikash Little, Barrett Hayes, Philip Fang, Max Khanzadeh, Matthew Killeen, Alyse Abbassi, Sam Cryptography and Security Verifying the private liquidity state of Lightning Network (LN) channels is desirable for auditors, service providers, and network participants who need assurance of financial capacity. Current methods often lack robustness against a malicious or compromised node operator. This paper introduces a methodology for the verification of LN channel balances. The core contribution is a framework that combines Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) with Zero-Knowledge Transport Layer Security (zkTLS) to provide strong, hardware-backed guarantees. In our proposed method, the node's balance-reporting software runs within a TEE, which generates a remote attestation quote proving the software's integrity. This attestation is then served via an Application Programming Interface (API), and zkTLS is used to prove the authenticity of its delivery. We also analyze an alternative variant where the TEE signs the report directly without zkTLS, discussing the trade-offs between transport-layer verification and direct enclave signing. We further refine this by distinguishing between "Hot Proofs" (verifiable claims via TEEs) and "Cold Proofs" (on-chain settlement), and discuss critical security considerations including hardware vulnerabilities, privacy leakage to third-party APIs, and the performance overhead of enclaved operations. |
| title | Verification of Lightning Network Channel Balances with Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.12095 |