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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.12133 |
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| _version_ | 1866914200193859584 |
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| author | Ren, Zishuo Lin, Yiting Zhang, Yufei Li, Yang Chen, Ziyang Guo, Hong |
| author_facet | Ren, Zishuo Lin, Yiting Zhang, Yufei Li, Yang Chen, Ziyang Guo, Hong |
| contents | A precise and secure time synchronization is the backbone of both fundamental physics and advanced technologies. Despite ultra-high precision, security, particularly the unresolved vulnerabilities on physical links beyond traditional cryptography, remains the bottleneck. Here, we develop an analysis framework, the Benchmark Attack Noise Detection (BAND) model, to quantify the security of the high-precision time synchronization when its core assumption, reciprocity, is broken. The model characterizes non-reciprocal attacks through a unified metric, termed attack intensity. Based on the analysis of attack intensity, we accurately predict both instantaneous and accumulating attacks in a 100-km dual-comb two-way time-transfer system. Beyond security considerations, we find that the BAND model can explain intrinsic fiber noise and delay-unsuppressed noise naturally, offering an effective tool to establish an environment-sensitive link model. This work paves the way for a secure large-scale integrated time, sensing and communication networks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_12133 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Benchmark for Non-reciprocal Attack Detection on Synchronization Ren, Zishuo Lin, Yiting Zhang, Yufei Li, Yang Chen, Ziyang Guo, Hong Optics A precise and secure time synchronization is the backbone of both fundamental physics and advanced technologies. Despite ultra-high precision, security, particularly the unresolved vulnerabilities on physical links beyond traditional cryptography, remains the bottleneck. Here, we develop an analysis framework, the Benchmark Attack Noise Detection (BAND) model, to quantify the security of the high-precision time synchronization when its core assumption, reciprocity, is broken. The model characterizes non-reciprocal attacks through a unified metric, termed attack intensity. Based on the analysis of attack intensity, we accurately predict both instantaneous and accumulating attacks in a 100-km dual-comb two-way time-transfer system. Beyond security considerations, we find that the BAND model can explain intrinsic fiber noise and delay-unsuppressed noise naturally, offering an effective tool to establish an environment-sensitive link model. This work paves the way for a secure large-scale integrated time, sensing and communication networks. |
| title | Benchmark for Non-reciprocal Attack Detection on Synchronization |
| topic | Optics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.12133 |