Algorithmic Criminal Liability in Greenwashing: Comparing India, United States, and European Union

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Singh, Sahibpreet, Singh, Manjit
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Singh, Sahibpreet
Singh, Manjit
author_facet Singh, Sahibpreet
Singh, Manjit
contents AI-powered greenwashing has emerged as an insidious challenge within corporate sustainability governance, exacerbating the opacity of environmental disclosures and subverting regulatory oversight. This study conducts a comparative legal analysis of criminal liability for AI-mediated greenwashing across India, the US, and the EU, exposing doctrinal lacunae in attributing culpability when deceptive claims originate from algorithmic systems. Existing statutes exhibit anthropocentric biases by predicating liability on demonstrable human intent, rendering them ill-equipped to address algorithmic deception. The research identifies a critical gap in jurisprudential adaptation, as prevailing fraud statutes remain antiquated vis-à-vis AI-generated misrepresentation. Utilising a doctrinal legal methodology, this study systematically dissects judicial precedents and statutory instruments, yielding results regarding the potential expansion of corporate criminal liability. Findings underscore the viability of strict liability models, recalibrated governance frameworks for AI accountability, and algorithmic due diligence mandates under ESG regimes. Comparative insights reveal jurisdictional disparities, with the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) offering a potential transnational model. This study contributes to AI ethics and environmental jurisprudence by advocating for a hybrid liability framework integrating algorithmic risk assessment with legal personhood constructs, ensuring algorithmic opacity does not preclude liability enforcement.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_12837
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Algorithmic Criminal Liability in Greenwashing: Comparing India, United States, and European Union
Singh, Sahibpreet
Singh, Manjit
Computers and Society
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
K.4.1; K.5
AI-powered greenwashing has emerged as an insidious challenge within corporate sustainability governance, exacerbating the opacity of environmental disclosures and subverting regulatory oversight. This study conducts a comparative legal analysis of criminal liability for AI-mediated greenwashing across India, the US, and the EU, exposing doctrinal lacunae in attributing culpability when deceptive claims originate from algorithmic systems. Existing statutes exhibit anthropocentric biases by predicating liability on demonstrable human intent, rendering them ill-equipped to address algorithmic deception. The research identifies a critical gap in jurisprudential adaptation, as prevailing fraud statutes remain antiquated vis-à-vis AI-generated misrepresentation. Utilising a doctrinal legal methodology, this study systematically dissects judicial precedents and statutory instruments, yielding results regarding the potential expansion of corporate criminal liability. Findings underscore the viability of strict liability models, recalibrated governance frameworks for AI accountability, and algorithmic due diligence mandates under ESG regimes. Comparative insights reveal jurisdictional disparities, with the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) offering a potential transnational model. This study contributes to AI ethics and environmental jurisprudence by advocating for a hybrid liability framework integrating algorithmic risk assessment with legal personhood constructs, ensuring algorithmic opacity does not preclude liability enforcement.
title Algorithmic Criminal Liability in Greenwashing: Comparing India, United States, and European Union
topic Computers and Society
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
K.4.1; K.5
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.12837