Belief in Simplicial Complexes
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866918250558783488 |
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| author | Sink, Philip Bjorndahl, Adam |
| author_facet | Sink, Philip Bjorndahl, Adam |
| contents | We provide a novel semantics for belief using simplicial complexes. In our framework, belief satisfies the \textsf{KD45} axioms and rules as well as the ``knowledge implies belief'' axiom ($Kϕ\lthen Bϕ$); in addition, we adopt the (standard) assumption that each facet in our simplicial models has exactly one vertex of every color. No existing model of belief in simplicial complexes that we are aware of is able to satisfy all of these conditions without trivializing belief to coincide with knowledge. We also address the common technical assumption of ``properness'' for relational structures made in the simplicial semantics literature, namely, that no two worlds fall into the same knowledge cell for all agents; we argue that there are conceptually sensible belief frames in which this assumption is violated, and use the result of ``A Note on Proper Relational Structures'' to bypass this restriction. We conclude with a discussion of how an alternative ``simplicial sets'' framework could allow us to bypass properness altogether and perhaps provide a more streamlined simplicial framework for representing belief. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_14647 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Belief in Simplicial Complexes Sink, Philip Bjorndahl, Adam Logic in Computer Science Logic 03B42 F.4.1 We provide a novel semantics for belief using simplicial complexes. In our framework, belief satisfies the \textsf{KD45} axioms and rules as well as the ``knowledge implies belief'' axiom ($Kϕ\lthen Bϕ$); in addition, we adopt the (standard) assumption that each facet in our simplicial models has exactly one vertex of every color. No existing model of belief in simplicial complexes that we are aware of is able to satisfy all of these conditions without trivializing belief to coincide with knowledge. We also address the common technical assumption of ``properness'' for relational structures made in the simplicial semantics literature, namely, that no two worlds fall into the same knowledge cell for all agents; we argue that there are conceptually sensible belief frames in which this assumption is violated, and use the result of ``A Note on Proper Relational Structures'' to bypass this restriction. We conclude with a discussion of how an alternative ``simplicial sets'' framework could allow us to bypass properness altogether and perhaps provide a more streamlined simplicial framework for representing belief. |
| title | Belief in Simplicial Complexes |
| topic | Logic in Computer Science Logic 03B42 F.4.1 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.14647 |