Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911323978203136 |
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| author | Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| author_facet | Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. |
| contents | In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness, known as non-obvious manipulability. We show that the combination of efficiency and non-obvious manipulability leads to impossibility results, whereas weakening efficiency to unanimity gives rise to a large family of well-behaved non-obviously manipulable rules. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_15024 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences Arribillaga, R. Pablo Bonifacio, Agustin G. Theoretical Economics In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness, known as non-obvious manipulability. We show that the combination of efficiency and non-obvious manipulability leads to impossibility results, whereas weakening efficiency to unanimity gives rise to a large family of well-behaved non-obviously manipulable rules. |
| title | Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.15024 |