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Continue the Analogy of Physics and Economics. Self-induced Transparency Mechanism as an Invisible Hand of Market

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Samokish, Anton, Egorushkin, Valeriy
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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