Variable Record Table: A Unified Hardware-Assisted Framework for Runtime Security
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866917154742337536 |
|---|---|
| author | Sah, Suraj Kumar Sah, Love Kumar |
| author_facet | Sah, Suraj Kumar Sah, Love Kumar |
| contents | Modern computing systems face security threats, including memory corruption attacks, speculative execution vulnerabilities, and control-flow hijacking. Although existing solutions address these threats individually, they frequently introduce performance overhead and leave security gaps. This paper presents a Variable Record Table (VRT) with a unified hardware-assisted framework that simultaneously enforces spatial memory safety against buffer overflows, back-edge control-flow integrity (CFI), and speculative execution attack detection. The VRT dynamically constructs a protection table by instrumenting run-time instructions to extract memory addresses, bounds metadata, and control-flow signatures. Our evaluation across MiBench and SPEC benchmarks shows that VRT successfully detects all attack variants tested with zero additional instruction overhead. Furthermore, it maintains memory requirements below 25KB (for 512 entries) and maintains area / power overhead under 8% and 11.65 μW, respectively. By consolidating three essential security mechanisms into a single hardware structure, VRT provides comprehensive protection while minimizing performance impact. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_15777 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Variable Record Table: A Unified Hardware-Assisted Framework for Runtime Security Sah, Suraj Kumar Sah, Love Kumar Cryptography and Security Modern computing systems face security threats, including memory corruption attacks, speculative execution vulnerabilities, and control-flow hijacking. Although existing solutions address these threats individually, they frequently introduce performance overhead and leave security gaps. This paper presents a Variable Record Table (VRT) with a unified hardware-assisted framework that simultaneously enforces spatial memory safety against buffer overflows, back-edge control-flow integrity (CFI), and speculative execution attack detection. The VRT dynamically constructs a protection table by instrumenting run-time instructions to extract memory addresses, bounds metadata, and control-flow signatures. Our evaluation across MiBench and SPEC benchmarks shows that VRT successfully detects all attack variants tested with zero additional instruction overhead. Furthermore, it maintains memory requirements below 25KB (for 512 entries) and maintains area / power overhead under 8% and 11.65 μW, respectively. By consolidating three essential security mechanisms into a single hardware structure, VRT provides comprehensive protection while minimizing performance impact. |
| title | Variable Record Table: A Unified Hardware-Assisted Framework for Runtime Security |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.15777 |