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Main Authors: Li, Zhiwei, Pang, Yitian, Wang, Weining, Sun, Zhenan, Li, Qi
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.16523
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author Li, Zhiwei
Pang, Yitian
Wang, Weining
Sun, Zhenan
Li, Qi
author_facet Li, Zhiwei
Pang, Yitian
Wang, Weining
Sun, Zhenan
Li, Qi
contents Vision-Language Models (VLMs), such as CLIP, have achieved impressive zero-shot recognition performance but remain highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations, posing significant risks in safety-critical scenarios. Previous training-time defenses rely on adversarial fine-tuning, which requires labeled data and costly retraining, while existing test-time strategies fail to reliably distinguish between clean and adversarial inputs, thereby preventing both adversarial robustness and clean accuracy from reaching their optimum. To address these limitations, we propose Test-Time Padding (TTP), a lightweight defense framework that performs adversarial detection followed by targeted adaptation at inference. TTP identifies adversarial inputs via the cosine similarity shift between CLIP feature embeddings computed before and after spatial padding, yielding a universal threshold for reliable detection across architectures and datasets. For detected adversarial cases, TTP employs trainable padding to restore disrupted attention patterns, coupled with a similarity-aware ensemble strategy for a more robust final prediction. For clean inputs, TTP leaves them unchanged by default or optionally integrates existing test-time adaptation techniques for further accuracy gains. Comprehensive experiments on diverse CLIP backbones and fine-grained benchmarks show that TTP consistently surpasses state-of-the-art test-time defenses, delivering substantial improvements in adversarial robustness without compromising clean accuracy. The code for this paper will be released soon.
format Preprint
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institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle TTP: Test-Time Padding for Adversarial Detection and Robust Adaptation on Vision-Language Models
Li, Zhiwei
Pang, Yitian
Wang, Weining
Sun, Zhenan
Li, Qi
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
Vision-Language Models (VLMs), such as CLIP, have achieved impressive zero-shot recognition performance but remain highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations, posing significant risks in safety-critical scenarios. Previous training-time defenses rely on adversarial fine-tuning, which requires labeled data and costly retraining, while existing test-time strategies fail to reliably distinguish between clean and adversarial inputs, thereby preventing both adversarial robustness and clean accuracy from reaching their optimum. To address these limitations, we propose Test-Time Padding (TTP), a lightweight defense framework that performs adversarial detection followed by targeted adaptation at inference. TTP identifies adversarial inputs via the cosine similarity shift between CLIP feature embeddings computed before and after spatial padding, yielding a universal threshold for reliable detection across architectures and datasets. For detected adversarial cases, TTP employs trainable padding to restore disrupted attention patterns, coupled with a similarity-aware ensemble strategy for a more robust final prediction. For clean inputs, TTP leaves them unchanged by default or optionally integrates existing test-time adaptation techniques for further accuracy gains. Comprehensive experiments on diverse CLIP backbones and fine-grained benchmarks show that TTP consistently surpasses state-of-the-art test-time defenses, delivering substantial improvements in adversarial robustness without compromising clean accuracy. The code for this paper will be released soon.
title TTP: Test-Time Padding for Adversarial Detection and Robust Adaptation on Vision-Language Models
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.16523