Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917154909061120 |
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| author | Urgun, Can Whitmeyer, Mark |
| author_facet | Urgun, Can Whitmeyer, Mark |
| contents | We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal path and delay the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We show that, although both instruments are available, any optimal persuasion scheme is fully transparent: the sender keeps the signal fully informative and persuades solely by choosing when to stop. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_16850 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time Urgun, Can Whitmeyer, Mark Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal path and delay the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We show that, although both instruments are available, any optimal persuasion scheme is fully transparent: the sender keeps the signal fully informative and persuades solely by choosing when to stop. |
| title | Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.16850 |