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Autori principali: Buzás, Ernő, Szilva, Attila
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17085
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author Buzás, Ernő
Szilva, Attila
author_facet Buzás, Ernő
Szilva, Attila
contents Independent voters play an increasingly decisive role in contemporary elections, yet their collective behavior remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how a minority of voters with greater flexibility in their political preferences influences opinion formation in polarized electorates. Using a modified Deffuant model, we show that even simple heterogeneity in agents' openness to vote switching can generate rich and unexpected collective outcomes: "open-minded" agents may (i) prevent full convergence into established party blocs, (ii) give rise to transient centrist clusters, or (iii) align with the positions of major parties. These dynamics resemble empirical patterns observed among real-world independent voters. Our results demonstrate that small shifts in openness parameters can substantially reshape the macroscopic structure of political competition, offering a simple explanation for oscillatory electoral outcomes and the emergence of unstable centrist or cross-cutting coalitions.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_17085
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The charm of independent voters
Buzás, Ernő
Szilva, Attila
Physics and Society
Independent voters play an increasingly decisive role in contemporary elections, yet their collective behavior remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how a minority of voters with greater flexibility in their political preferences influences opinion formation in polarized electorates. Using a modified Deffuant model, we show that even simple heterogeneity in agents' openness to vote switching can generate rich and unexpected collective outcomes: "open-minded" agents may (i) prevent full convergence into established party blocs, (ii) give rise to transient centrist clusters, or (iii) align with the positions of major parties. These dynamics resemble empirical patterns observed among real-world independent voters. Our results demonstrate that small shifts in openness parameters can substantially reshape the macroscopic structure of political competition, offering a simple explanation for oscillatory electoral outcomes and the emergence of unstable centrist or cross-cutting coalitions.
title The charm of independent voters
topic Physics and Society
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17085