Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866909970677628928 |
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| author | Dawid, Richard Franzmann, Guilherme |
| author_facet | Dawid, Richard Franzmann, Guilherme |
| contents | Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_17124 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory Dawid, Richard Franzmann, Guilherme History and Philosophy of Physics High Energy Physics - Theory Quantum Physics Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism. |
| title | Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics High Energy Physics - Theory Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17124 |