MAPPO-LCR: Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization with Local Cooperation Reward in Spatial Public Goods Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Yang, Zhaoqilin, Xiang, Axin, Yang, Kedi, Liu, Tianjun, Tian, Youliang
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Yang, Zhaoqilin
Xiang, Axin
Yang, Kedi
Liu, Tianjun
Tian, Youliang
author_facet Yang, Zhaoqilin
Xiang, Axin
Yang, Kedi
Liu, Tianjun
Tian, Youliang
contents Spatial public goods games model collective dilemmas where individual payoffs depend on population-level strategy configurations. Most existing studies rely on evolutionary update rules or value-based reinforcement learning methods. These approaches struggle to represent payoff coupling and non-stationarity in large interacting populations. This work introduces Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization (MAPPO) into spatial public goods games for the first time. In these games, individual returns are intrinsically coupled through overlapping group interactions. Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) treats agents as independent learners and ignores this coupling during value estimation. MAPPO addresses this limitation through a centralized critic that evaluates joint strategy configurations. To study neighborhood-level cooperation signals under this framework, we propose MAPPO with Local Cooperation Reward, termed MAPPO-LCR. The local cooperation reward aligns policy updates with surrounding cooperative density without altering the original game structure. MAPPO-LCR preserves decentralized execution while enabling population-level value estimation during training. Extensive simulations demonstrate stable cooperation emergence and reliable convergence across enhancement factors. Statistical analyses further confirm the learning advantage of MAPPO over PPO in spatial public goods games.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_17187
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle MAPPO-LCR: Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization with Local Cooperation Reward in Spatial Public Goods Games
Yang, Zhaoqilin
Xiang, Axin
Yang, Kedi
Liu, Tianjun
Tian, Youliang
Multiagent Systems
Computer Science and Game Theory
Spatial public goods games model collective dilemmas where individual payoffs depend on population-level strategy configurations. Most existing studies rely on evolutionary update rules or value-based reinforcement learning methods. These approaches struggle to represent payoff coupling and non-stationarity in large interacting populations. This work introduces Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization (MAPPO) into spatial public goods games for the first time. In these games, individual returns are intrinsically coupled through overlapping group interactions. Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) treats agents as independent learners and ignores this coupling during value estimation. MAPPO addresses this limitation through a centralized critic that evaluates joint strategy configurations. To study neighborhood-level cooperation signals under this framework, we propose MAPPO with Local Cooperation Reward, termed MAPPO-LCR. The local cooperation reward aligns policy updates with surrounding cooperative density without altering the original game structure. MAPPO-LCR preserves decentralized execution while enabling population-level value estimation during training. Extensive simulations demonstrate stable cooperation emergence and reliable convergence across enhancement factors. Statistical analyses further confirm the learning advantage of MAPPO over PPO in spatial public goods games.
title MAPPO-LCR: Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization with Local Cooperation Reward in Spatial Public Goods Games
topic Multiagent Systems
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17187