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Fairly Dividing Non-identical Random Items: Just Sample or Match

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Kale, Aprup, Kulkarni, Rucha, Garg, Navya
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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