Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequential Attacker--Defender Games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917156899258368 |
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| author | Iqbal, Azhar Chappell, James M. Abbott, Derek |
| author_facet | Iqbal, Azhar Chappell, James M. Abbott, Derek |
| contents | We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after which the attacker best-responds via backward induction. Closed-form expressions for equilibrium protection and attack strategies are derived for general numbers of assets and defensive resources. Necessary constraints on rewards and costs are established to ensure feasibility of the probability distributions. Three distinct payoff regimes for the defender are identified and analysed. An eight-asset numerical example illustrates the equilibrium structure and reveals a unique Pareto-dominant attack configuration. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_17284 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequential Attacker--Defender Games Iqbal, Azhar Chappell, James M. Abbott, Derek Computer Science and Game Theory We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after which the attacker best-responds via backward induction. Closed-form expressions for equilibrium protection and attack strategies are derived for general numbers of assets and defensive resources. Necessary constraints on rewards and costs are established to ensure feasibility of the probability distributions. Three distinct payoff regimes for the defender are identified and analysed. An eight-asset numerical example illustrates the equilibrium structure and reveals a unique Pareto-dominant attack configuration. |
| title | Analytical Stackelberg Resource Allocation in Sequential Attacker--Defender Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.17284 |