Timing-Aware Two-Player Stochastic Games with Self-Triggered Control

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Pan, Yunian, Zhu, Quanyan
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866912779325145088
author Pan, Yunian
Zhu, Quanyan
author_facet Pan, Yunian
Zhu, Quanyan
contents We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls yields flow regions (both hold) and trigger surfaces (at least one updates). The framework covers both blind simultaneous (Nash) timing and observable sequential (Stackelberg) commitments; the former leads to coupled, intractable QVIs, while the latter admits a nested Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman quasi-variational inequality and a tractable dynamic-programming decomposition. We outline a computational scheme based on implicit differentiation of the follower's fixed point. A pursuit-evasion example illustrates the strategic timing interaction.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_18109
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Timing-Aware Two-Player Stochastic Games with Self-Triggered Control
Pan, Yunian
Zhu, Quanyan
Systems and Control
We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls yields flow regions (both hold) and trigger surfaces (at least one updates). The framework covers both blind simultaneous (Nash) timing and observable sequential (Stackelberg) commitments; the former leads to coupled, intractable QVIs, while the latter admits a nested Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman quasi-variational inequality and a tractable dynamic-programming decomposition. We outline a computational scheme based on implicit differentiation of the follower's fixed point. A pursuit-evasion example illustrates the strategic timing interaction.
title Timing-Aware Two-Player Stochastic Games with Self-Triggered Control
topic Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.18109