Imagen de Portada

Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Dimitrov, Dinko, Majumdar, Dipjyoti
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Information-Credible Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information
por: Mishra, Kaibalyapati
Publicado: (2025)

Incomplete Information Robustness
por: Morris, Stephen, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information
por: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Rationalizability and Monotonocity in Games with Incomplete Information
por: van Sloun, Joep
Publicado: (2025)

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
por: Häfner, Samuel, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Minimizing Instability in Strategy-Proof Matching Mechanism Using A Linear Programming Approach
por: Sugano, Tohya
Publicado: (2025)

Allocating Positional Goods: A Mechanism Design Approach
por: Xiao, Peiran
Publicado: (2024)

Payoff Continuity in Games of Incomplete Information Across Models of Knowledge
por: Kambhampati, Ashwin
Publicado: (2025)

Connected Incomplete Preferences
por: Gorno, Leandro, et al.
Publicado: (2020)

Aggregating Incomplete Rankings
por: Okumura, Yasunori
Publicado: (2024)

A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness
por: Tarsney, Christian, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
por: Yan, Eric
Publicado: (2024)

Beyond Scalars: Zonotope-Valued Utility for Representation of Multidimensional Incomplete Preferences(Incomplete Version)
por: Ramezanzadeh, Behrooz Moosavi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers: A Queueing Theory Approach
por: Li, Zihao, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Matching Design with Algorithms and Applications to Foster Care
por: Highsmith Ii, Terence
Publicado: (2024)

Identification of Incomplete Preferences
por: Rigotti, Luca, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
por: Doval, Laura, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Designing Simple Mechanisms
por: Li, Shengwu
Publicado: (2024)

Mechanism Design by a Politician
por: Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori
Publicado: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
por: Balzer, Benjamin, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Testing a Graph-Theoretic Condition for Aggregating Incomplete Rankings: A Technical Note
por: Okumura, Yasunori
Publicado: (2026)

Eliciting and Distinguishing Between Weak and Incomplete Preferences: Theory, Experiment and Computation
por: Gerasimou, Georgios
Publicado: (2021)

Wage Dispersion, On-the-Job Search, and Stochastic Match Productivity: A Mean Field Game Approach
por: Buhai, I. Sebastian
Publicado: (2025)

Matching Under Preference Uncertainty: Random Allocation, Informativeness, and Welfare
por: Ho, Yu-Ting
Publicado: (2025)

Optimal Procurement Design: A Reduced-Form Approach
por: Zhang, Kun
Publicado: (2025)

Endogenous Product Design: A Linear Demand Approach
por: Rodrigues, Afonso
Publicado: (2026)

Coarse Information Design
por: Lyu, Qianjun, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle
por: Xiong, Siyang
Publicado: (2024)

Characteristics Design: A Hedonic Approach to Optimal Product Differentiation
por: Miyashita, Masaki
Publicado: (2026)

The Design of Monopoly Information Broker
por: Chen, Junjie, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Robust Information Acquisition Design
por: Gao, Eric, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Information Design in Smooth Games
por: Smolin, Alex, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Information Design in Cheap Talk
por: Lyu, Qianjun, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
por: Anunrojwong, Jerry, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms: Optimal Design and Investment Incentives
por: Augias, Victor, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Matching to two sides
por: Huang, Chao
Publicado: (2025)

Capacitated Spatiotemporal Matching
por: Fu, Mingyang, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer via Automated Mechanism Design
por: Hashimoto, Kento, et al.
Publicado: (2025)