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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.20353 |
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- This chapter surveys the application of matching theory to school choice, motivated by the shift from neighborhood assignment systems to choice-based models. Since educational choice is not mediated by price, the design of allocation mechanisms is critical. The chapter first reviews theoretical contributions, exploring the fundamental trade-offs between efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness, and covers design challenges such as tie-breaking, cardinal welfare, and affirmative action. It then transitions to the empirical landscape, focusing on the central challenge of inferring student preferences from application data, especially under strategic mechanisms. We review various estimation approaches and discuss key insights on parental preferences, market design trade-offs, and the effectiveness of school choice policies?