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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.21367 |
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| _version_ | 1866918263758258176 |
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| author | Ballard, Mark Song, Guanqun Zhu, Ting |
| author_facet | Ballard, Mark Song, Guanqun Zhu, Ting |
| contents | The rapid proliferation of satellite constellations, particularly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), has fundamentally altered the global space infrastructure, shifting the risk landscape from purely kinetic collisions to complex cyber-physical threats. While traditional safety frameworks focus on debris mitigation, ground-based adversaries increasingly exploit radio-frequency links, supply chain vulnerabilities, and software update pathways to degrade space assets. This paper presents a comparative analysis of satellite cybersecurity across LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) regimes. By synthesizing data from 60 publicly documented security incidents with key vulnerability proxies--including Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) anomalies, encryption weaknesses, and environmental stressors--we characterize how orbital altitude dictates attack feasibility and impact. Our evaluation reveals distinct threat profiles: GEO systems are predominantly targeted via high-frequency uplink exposure, whereas LEO constellations face unique risks stemming from limited power budgets, hardware constraints, and susceptibility to thermal and radiation-induced faults. We further bridge the gap between security and sustainability, arguing that unmitigated cyber vulnerabilities accelerate hardware obsolescence and debris accumulation, undermining efforts toward carbon-neutral space operations. The results demonstrate that weak encryption and command path irregularities are the most consistent predictors of adversarial success across all orbits. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_21367 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Satellite Cybersecurity Across Orbital Altitudes: Analyzing Ground-Based Threats to LEO, MEO, and GEO Ballard, Mark Song, Guanqun Zhu, Ting Cryptography and Security The rapid proliferation of satellite constellations, particularly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), has fundamentally altered the global space infrastructure, shifting the risk landscape from purely kinetic collisions to complex cyber-physical threats. While traditional safety frameworks focus on debris mitigation, ground-based adversaries increasingly exploit radio-frequency links, supply chain vulnerabilities, and software update pathways to degrade space assets. This paper presents a comparative analysis of satellite cybersecurity across LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) regimes. By synthesizing data from 60 publicly documented security incidents with key vulnerability proxies--including Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) anomalies, encryption weaknesses, and environmental stressors--we characterize how orbital altitude dictates attack feasibility and impact. Our evaluation reveals distinct threat profiles: GEO systems are predominantly targeted via high-frequency uplink exposure, whereas LEO constellations face unique risks stemming from limited power budgets, hardware constraints, and susceptibility to thermal and radiation-induced faults. We further bridge the gap between security and sustainability, arguing that unmitigated cyber vulnerabilities accelerate hardware obsolescence and debris accumulation, undermining efforts toward carbon-neutral space operations. The results demonstrate that weak encryption and command path irregularities are the most consistent predictors of adversarial success across all orbits. |
| title | Satellite Cybersecurity Across Orbital Altitudes: Analyzing Ground-Based Threats to LEO, MEO, and GEO |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.21367 |