Machine Learning Power Side-Channel Attack on SNOW-V

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Deepak, Balout, Rahul, Golder, Anupam, Kundu, Suparna, Karmakar, Angshuman, Das, Debayan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Deepak
Balout, Rahul
Golder, Anupam
Kundu, Suparna
Karmakar, Angshuman
Das, Debayan
author_facet Deepak
Balout, Rahul
Golder, Anupam
Kundu, Suparna
Karmakar, Angshuman
Das, Debayan
contents This paper demonstrates a power analysis-based Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attack on the SNOW-V encryption algorithm, which is a 5G mobile communication security standard candidate. Implemented on an STM32 microcontroller, power traces captured with a ChipWhisperer board were analyzed, with Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) confirming exploitable leakage. Profiling attacks using Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Fully Connected Neural Networks (FCN) achieved efficient key recovery, with FCN achieving > 5X lower minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) compared to the state-of-the-art Correlational Power Analysis (CPA) assisted with LDA. The results highlight the vulnerability of SNOW-V to machine learning-based SCA and the need for robust countermeasures.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_21737
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Machine Learning Power Side-Channel Attack on SNOW-V
Deepak
Balout, Rahul
Golder, Anupam
Kundu, Suparna
Karmakar, Angshuman
Das, Debayan
Cryptography and Security
This paper demonstrates a power analysis-based Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attack on the SNOW-V encryption algorithm, which is a 5G mobile communication security standard candidate. Implemented on an STM32 microcontroller, power traces captured with a ChipWhisperer board were analyzed, with Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) confirming exploitable leakage. Profiling attacks using Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Fully Connected Neural Networks (FCN) achieved efficient key recovery, with FCN achieving > 5X lower minimum traces to disclosure (MTD) compared to the state-of-the-art Correlational Power Analysis (CPA) assisted with LDA. The results highlight the vulnerability of SNOW-V to machine learning-based SCA and the need for robust countermeasures.
title Machine Learning Power Side-Channel Attack on SNOW-V
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.21737